On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 10:34:41AM +0200, Sfan5 wrote:
> We manually check the verification status after the handshake has completed
> using mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). However with VERIFY_REQUIRED
> mbedtls_ssl_handshake() already returns an error, so this code is never
> reached.
> Fix that by using VERIFY_OPTIONAL, which performs the verification but
> does not abort the handshake.
> 
> Signed-off-by: sfan5 <sfan5@live.de>
> ---
>  libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c
> index 9508fe3436..67d5c568b9 100644
> --- a/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c
> +++ b/libavformat/tls_mbedtls.c
> @@ -263,8 +263,9 @@ static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int
> flags, AVDictionary **op
>          goto fail;
>      }
>  +    // not VERIFY_REQUIRED because we manually check after handshake
>      mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&tls_ctx->ssl_config,
> -                              shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED :
> MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
> +                              shr->verify ? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL :
> MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
>      mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
> &tls_ctx->ctr_drbg_context);
>      mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&tls_ctx->ssl_config, &tls_ctx->ca_cert,
> NULL);

This patch looks corrupted by extra line breaks

[...]

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